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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
The parties to this Appeal are the Plaintiff/Appellee Woods
Cross, a municipal corporation, and the Defendant/Appellant Craig
Kirk.
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IV
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to the
provisions of Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, Section 78-2a-3(d).

V
ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues on appeal are as follows:
Issues of Fact:
a)

did the trial court err in concluding that the

Appellant owned the property located at 1450 West 500 South,
Woods Cross, Utah?
b)

did the trial court err in concluding that the property

located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross, Utah is zoned A-l?
c)

did the trial court err in concluding that the

Appellant was violating the Zoning Ordinances of Woods Cross in
the Appellant's use of the property located at 1450 West 500
South, Woods Cross, Utah?
d)

did the trial court err in concluding that the

Affidavits of Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch,
Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens made on personal knowledge and
,therefore, admissible in support of Appellee's Summary Judgment
Motion?
Standard of review for issues of fact:
Issues of fact may be reversed on appeal only if they are
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found to be clearly erroneous.

Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d

919 (Utah 1988).
Issues of Law:
a)

did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting

the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment?
b)

did the trial court err as a matter of law in

concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact
present which precluded the trial court from granting the
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment?
c)

did the trial court err as a matter of law in failing

to grant the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss?
d)

did the trial court err as a matter of law in failing

to hear and rule on the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss prior to
ruling on the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment?
e)

did the trial court err as a matter of law in failing

to hear or rule on the Appellant's Motions to Strike the
Affidavits of Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch,
Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens before granting the Appellee's
Motion for Summary Judgment?
f)

did the trial court err as a matter of law in

concluding that Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie
Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens were competent to testify
to the alleged facts set forth in their Affidavits?
g)

did the trial court err as a matter of law in
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Sinaelton v, Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d
126 (1967)
Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 485 (Utah 1978)
State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382,
412 P.2d 914 (Utah 1966)
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co,, 16 Utah 2d 30,
395 P.2d 62 (1964)
Walker v. Rockey Mt. Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274,
508 P.2d 538 (1973)
Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist,
29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1972)
Rules:

Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure, Rule 56
Statutes:
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, Section 78-2a-3(d)

vn
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(A)
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal to this Court from the trial court's
grant of Suicaaary Judgment, entered on March 24, 1993, in favor of
the Appellee and against the Appellant on Appellee's claims that
the Appellee is entitled to a permanent injunction prohibiting
the Appellant from using the property located at 1450 West 500
South, Woods Cross City, Utah for industrial and/or commercial
8

concluding that the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment was
timely?
Standard of review for issues of law:
Issues of law are subject to de novo review by an appellate
court, and the court gives no deference to the trial court's
conclusions of law.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d

634 (Utah 1989).

VI
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES,RULES, AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982)
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State.
779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989)
Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Ctr., Inc.,
11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960)
Cornish Town v. Roller. 758 P.2d 919 (1988)
Downtown Athletic Club v. Hormanf 740 P.2d 275
(Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, &65 P.2d 1277 (1987)
Freed Fin Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.p 537 P.2d 1039
(Utah 1975)
Holbrook Co. V. Adams. 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975)
Judkins v. Toone. 27, Utah 2d 17, 492 P.2d 980 (1972)
Lockhart v. Anderson. 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 1982)
Morris v. Farnsworth Motel. 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d
297 (1953)
Sandberq v. Klein. 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978)
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8.

The trial court never entertained any argument on the

Appellant's Motion to Dismiss.
9.

The trial court never entertained any argument on the

Appellant's Motions to Strike the Affidavits of Brent Stephenson,
Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens.
10.

On March 9, 1993, the trial court granted the

Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
11.

The Summary Judgment Motion was entered on March 24,

12.

The Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on April 23,

1993.

1993.
(C)
DISPOSITION OF CASE AT TRLiL COURT
The trial court granted the Appellee's Summary Judgment
Motion on April 9, 1993, without entertaining argument on or
addressing the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss or his Motion to
Strike or the Appellant's Counterclaim.

(D)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Appellant is the owner of real property located in

Woods Cross City, Utah. (Record at page 141, f 4).
2.

On August 12, 1992, the Appellee served the Appellant

with a Summons and Complaint alleging that the Appellant was the
owner of real property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods
Cross City, Utah.

(Record at page 6).
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uses, and that the Appellee is entitled to a permanent injunction
prohibiting the Appellant from conducting a business on the
property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City.

(B)
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL COURT LEVEL
1.

On August 12, 1992, the Appellee served the Appellant

with a Summons and Complaint alleging that the Appellant was the
owner of real property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods
Cross City, Utah.

The Appellant filed an Amended Answer, on or

about, October 19, 1992.
2.

The Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, on or

about, November 2, 1992.
3.

The Appellant filed Motions to Strike the Affidavits of

Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch, Duro Gertsch,
and Tim Stephens, which were submitted in support of Appellee's
Motion for Summary Judgment, on or about December 8, 1992.
4.

The Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss on or about

December 18, 1992.
5.

The Appellee filed a Notice to Submit its Summary

Judgment Motion for decision on, or about, December 2, 1992.
6.

The Appellant filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings on, or

about, January 14, 1993.
7.

The Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard on

or about February 11, 1993.
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3.

In its Complaint, the Appellee alleged that the

property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah
is zoned A-l Agricultural.
4.

(Record at page 1-2).

In paragraph No. 4 of its Complaint, the Appellee

asserts that the Appellant applied for a building permit to build
a barn on the property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods
Cross City, Utah.
5.

(Record at page 2).

In paragraph No. 6 of its Complaint, the Appellee

alleges that the Appellant is using the property located at 1450
West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah, for industrial purposes
in violation of the Woods Cross City zoning ordinances.

(Record

at page 2-3).
6.

In paragraphs 9-10, the Appellee asserts that it is

entitled to a permanent injunction prohibiting the Appellant from
using the property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross
City, Utah, for industrial and/or commercial uses.

(Record at

page 3).
7.

In paragraphs 12-13, the Appellee asserts that it is

entitled to a permanent injunction prohibiting the Appellant from
conducting a business on the property located at 1450 West 500
South, Woods Cross City, Utah.
8.

(Record at page 4).

The Appellant is not the owner of the property located

at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah.

(Record at page

141, II 2).
9.

The Appellant has never claimed to own the property
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located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah.

(Record

at page 141, fl 2) .
10.

The property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods

Cross City, Utah, is on the opposite side of the street from the
property owned by the Appellant that is located on 500 South in
Woods Cross City, Utah.
11.

(Record at page 141, K 3).

The Appellant does not conduct any business on the

property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah.
(Record at page 141, f 5) .
12.

The Appellant does not park any of his vehicles or

equipment on the property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods
Cross City, Utah.
13.

(Record at page 141, H 7).

The property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods

Cross City, Utah, is not zoned A-l, but rather is zoned 1-1.
(Record at page 60).
14.
1, 1992.
15.

The Appellant filed an Answer on, or about, September
(Record at page 10-23).
The Appellant filed an Amended Answer on, or about,

October 19, 1992.
16.

(Record at page 30-36).

The Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on, or

about, November 2, 1992.
17.

(Record at page 38).

The Appellant filed Motions to Strike the Affidavits of

Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch, Duro Gertsch,
and Tim Stephens, which were submitted in support of Appellee's
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Motion for Summary Judgment, on or about, December 8, 1992,
(Record at page 85-109).
18.

The Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss on, or about,

December 18, 1992.
19.

(Record at page 129-143).

The Appellee filed a Notice to Submit its Summary

Judgment Motion for decision on, or about, December 22, 1993.
(Record at page 173).
20.

The Appellant filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings on, or

about, January 14, 1993.
21.

(Record at page 184).

The Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard

on, or about, February 11, 1993.
22.

The trial court never entertained argument on the

Appellant's Motion to Dismiss.
23.

(Record at page 217).

(Record at page 213-214).

The trial court never entertained argument on the

Appellant's Motions to Strike the Affidavits of Brent Stephenson,
Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens.
(Record at page 213-214).
24.

The trial court never entertained argument on the

Appellant's Counterclaim or Affirmative Defenses.

(Record at

page 213-214).
25.

On March 24, 1993, the trial court granted the

Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Record at page 217-

218) .
26.

Summary Judgment in favor of the Appellee was entered

on March 24, 1993.

(Record at page 217).
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27.
1993.

The Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on April 23,

(Record at page 221-222).
28.

On October 14, 1993 the trial Court granted Appellant's

Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal.

(Record at page 231).

vm
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred, both as a matter of fact and as a
matter of law, in granting the Appellee's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The trial court erred, both as a matter of fact and

as a matter of law, in concluding that the Appellee was entitled
to summary judgment on its cause of action against the Appellant
for conducting business without a license.

The trial court

erred, as a matter of law, in granting the Appellee's Motion for
Summary Judgment on the Appellant's Counterclaim and/or
affirmative defenses.

The trial court erred, as a matter of law,

in granting the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment without
first ruling on the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss Appellee's
complaint and without first ruling on Appellant's Motions to
Strike the affidavits submitted in support of Appellee's Motion
for Summary Judgment.

The trial court erred, as a mater of law,

in ruling on Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment before the
Appellant had the opportunity to conduct discovery and submit
evidence on his Counterclaim and affirmative defenses.
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IX
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER
OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED THE APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF FACT AND LAW IN
GRANTING THE APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR A PERMANENT INJUNCTION.
With respect to Appellee's cause of action for a "Permanent
Injunction", the trial court erred both as a matter of fact and
as a matter of law in concluding that there was no a genuine
issue of fact with respect to whether or not the Appellant is
violating any Woods Cross City zoning ordinances.

Because the

Appellant is not the owner of the property located at 1450 West
500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah, has never conducted any
business on that property nor ever parked any vehicles on that
property, the trial court erred both as a matter of fact and as a
matter of law in concluding that the Appellant is violating any
Woods Cross City zoning ordinances.
Additionally a genuine issue of fact exists as to the actual
zoning of the property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods
Cross City, Utah.

The Appellee asserts that the property is

zoned A-l; however, the Woods Cross City Zoning Map shows the
property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah
is zoned 1-1 rather than A-l.
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Because there are genuine issues of fact present in this
case, the Appellee was not entitled to Summary Judgment as a
matter of law.

It takes only one sworn statement to dispute

averments on the other side of a controversy and create an issue
of fact, precluding summary judgment.
P.2d 191 (Utah 1975).

Holbrook Co. V. Adams, 542

The Affidavit filed by the Appellant

disputed the Appellee's statement of facts in support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment and created genuine issues of
material fact in this case.
On a motion for summary judgment the adverse party is
entitled to have the court survey the evidence and all reasonable
inferences fairly drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
him.

Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Thompson

v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964); Morris v.
Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953).

In ruling

on a motion for summary judgment, the court may only consider
facts that are not in dispute.

Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 485

(Utah 1978).
In this case the trial court ignored the disputed facts and
weighed the evidence.

On summary judgment a court cannot

consider the weight of testimony or credibility of witnesses; the
court simply determines whether or not a material issue of facts
is present in the case and whether or not one party should
prevail as a matter of law.

Sandberq v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291

(Utah 1978); Sinaelton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126
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(1967).

Therefore, the trial court committed prejudicial and

reversible error, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law
in granting the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Consequently, the trial court's decision must be reversed and
remanded.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER OF
LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT THE APPELLEE WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON ITS CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CONDUCTING BUSINESS
WITHOUT A LICENSE.
At the trial court level, the Appellee did not produced one
iota of evidence which supported its assertion that the Appellant
is conducting business on the property located at 1450 West 500
South, Woods Cross City, Utah, with or without a business
license.

The only evidence before the trial court with respect

to the Appellant's alleged use of the property located at 1450
West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah, are statements from
several individuals wherein they state that they have seen large
trucks enter and leave the property and seen trucks and/or
equipment parked on the property.
Trucks entering and leaving property located at 1450 West
500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah, or trucks parked on the
property does not establish the existence of a business on the
property.

Furthermore, the Appellant dees not own the property

located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah, and,
therefore, the Appellant is not liable nor responsible for the
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activities which might occur on the property.

Additionally, the

Appellant stated in his uncontested Affidavit that he is not
conducting any business activity on the property, that he has no
telephone on the property and that he stores no material on the
property.

A party may not rely on allegations in the pleadings

to counter affidavits made upon personal knowledge stating facts
contrary to those alleged in pleadings.

Freed Fin Co. v. Stoker

Motor Co., 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975).
Because the Appellee did not produce, and cannot produce,
any evidence supporting its assertion that the Appellant is
conducting any business on the property located at 1450 West 500
South, Woods Cross City, Utah, and because the Appellee did not
file any affidavits contradicting the Appellants Affidavit
specifically declaring that he is not conducting business on the
property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah,
the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error, both
as a matter of fact and as a matter of law, in granting the
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Consequently, the trial

court's decision must be reversed and remanded.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE APPELLEE WAS
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In order for the Appellee to prevail on its Motion for
Summary Judgment at the trial court level, the Appellee had to
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demonstrate that:

1) there were no issues of material fact

present in this matter which precluded the trial court from
granting Summary Judgment in favor of the Appellee, and
2) that the Appellee was entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter
of law.

As established in by Appellant!s Memorandum in

Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment,, genuine
issues of material fact are present which preclude the trail
court from granting the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Furthermore, the Appellee did not, and could not, establish that
it was entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law.
It is an indisputable principal of law that on a summary
judgment motion, the trial court must review the facts and law in
the light most favorable to the party against whom Summary
Judgment is sought. See
P.2d 980 (1972).

Judkins v. Toone, 27, Utah 2d 17, 492

A summary judgment must be supported by

evidence, admissions and inferences which, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the loser, show that "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law" such showing
must preclude all reasonable possibility that the loser could, if
given a trial, produce evidence which reasonably sustain a
judgment in his favor.

Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Ctr., Inc.,

11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960).

Therefore, because the

Appellee did not/ and cannot, demonstrate that the Appellant has
engaged in any prohibited activity, on the property located at
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1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah, the Appellee was not
entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law.

Even if there

is no genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment is proper
only if the pleadings and other documents demonstrate that the
moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Lockhart v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 1982).
In order for the Appellee to assert that it is legally
entitled to a permanent injunction against the Appellant, the
Appellee must first establish that the Appellant has engaged in
some prohibited action sought to be enjoined.

The Appellee did

not established that the Appellant is engaging any such
prohibited activities on the property located at 1450 West 500
South, Woods Cross City, Utah.

Nor did the Appellee demonstrated

that any of the alleged actions, even if committed by the
Appellant, are a violation of the Woods Cross City zoning
ordinances.

Therefore, the Appellee did not established that it

is entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law.

The trial

court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted
the Appellee^ Motion for Summary Judgment.

Consequently, the

trial court's decision must be reversed and remanded.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING THE
APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE APPELLANTS
COUNTERCLAIM AND/OR AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES.
At the trial court level, the Appellee asserted that it was
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entitled to Summary Judgment on the Appellant's Counterclaim for
the reason that the Appellant had not exhausted his
administrative remedies.

The Appellee then cited the trial court

to a number of cases v/herein a party was precluded from asserting
certain causes of action or raising certain defenses because that
party failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by failing
to request any relief from the appropriate administrative agency.
Those cases were not applicable to the facts of this case for the
reason that the Appellant was attempting to exhaust his
administrative remedies while the Appellee was seeking to
preclude the Appellant from exhausting those remedies through
this litigation.
In the cases cited by the Appellee, the parties were only
precluded from asserting defenses or claims for the reason that
they had not attempted to solve their dilemmas through
appropriate administrative procedures.

In the instant matter,

unlike the parties in the cases cited by the Appellee, the
Appellant attempted to follow the appropriate administrative
procedure with respect to his property located at 1473 West 500
South, Woods Cross City, Utah.
The Appellant timely and properly petitioned Woods Cross
City for a change in the zoning of his property.
Zoning Commission granted that petition.

The Woods Cross

The Woods Cross City

Council, however, subsequently denied the Appellant's petition
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for no specified reason, and the Appellant filed an appeal of
that denial with the Second District Court.
The Appellant complied with his administrative remedies
prior to the time the trial court granted Appellee's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Therefore, the trial court committed

prejudicial and reversible error in summarily granting summary
judgment on the Appellee's Counterclaim and affirmative defenses.
Consequently, the trial court's decision must be reversed and
remanded.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING THE
APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT FIRST RULING
ON THE APPELLANTS MOTION TO DISMISS APPELLEE'S COMPLAINT AND
WITHOUT FIRST RULING ON APPELLANTS MOTIONS TO STRIKE THE
AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
I t i s an undisputed f a c t t h a t t h e t r i a l court never r u l e d on
A p p e l l a n t ' s Motion t o d i s m i s s A p p e l l e e ' s Complaint or on
A p p e l l a n t ' s Motions t o S t r i k e t h e A f f i d a v i t s of Brent Stephenson,
Gayle Stephenson, L e s l i e Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens,
which were submitted i n support of A p p e l l e e ' s Motion f o r Summary
Judgment.

The A f f i d a v i t s of Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson,

L e s l i e Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens were submitted i n
support of A p p e l l e e ' s Motion for Summary Judgment and were a
p r i n c i p a l part of t h e A p p e l l e e ' s Motion for Summary Judgment.
The A f f i d a v i t s a l l e g e d l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h e A p p e l l a n t ' s v i o l a t i o n s
complained of i n A p p e l l e e ' s Complaint.
22

The Affidavits of Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie
Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens were based on hearsay,
speculation, conclusion, and opinion, and therefore, were not
admissible under the precisions of Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Hearsay and opinion testimony that would not

be admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly be
set forth in an affidavit supporting a motion for summary
judgment.

Walker v. Rockev Mt. Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274,

508 P.2d 538 (1973); Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v.
Blomouist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1972).

Therefore,

the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when
it failed to consider or rule on the Appellantfs Motions to
Strike the Affidavits of Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson,
Leslie Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens prior to granting
the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The trial court

committed prejudicial and reversible error in failing to rule on
Appellant's Motions to Strike the Affidavits of Brent Stephenson,
Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens
prior to granting the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Consequently, the trial court's decision must be reversed and
remanded.
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POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, AS A MATER OF LAW, IN RULING ON
APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE THE APPELLANT
HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY AND SUBMIT
EVIDENCE ON HIS COUNTERCLAIM AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES.
Generally if discovery is incomplete summary judgment should
not be granted, because information ascertained through discovery
may reveal information that would create issues of fact, thus
precluding summary judgment.

Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman,

740 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, &65 P.2d 1277 (1987).
In the instant matter, the Appellant never had the opportunity to
conduct any discovery.
discovery.

The Appellant was entitled to conduct

Discovery should be liberally permitted.

State ex

rel. Rd. Comm'n v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914 (Utah
1966).
In this matter, the trial court simply entertained and
granted the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment without
permitting the Appellant to conduct discovery and without
permitting the Appellant to develop his Counterclaim or
affirmative defenses.

The trial court committed prejudicial and

reversible error by entertaining and ruling on Appelleefs Motion
for Summary Judgment before discovery was complete and the
Appellant had the opportunity to develop and present information
supporting his Counterclaim and affirmative defenses.
Consequently, the trial court's decision must be reversed and
remanded.
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X
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The trial court committed reversible and prejudicial error
when it granted the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgement.
Therefore, the trial court's grant of Summary Judgment must be
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the Appellant respectfully request that the
Summary Judgment entered by the trial court be reversed and this
matter be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

-> fl

Respectfully submitted this*r£2_L_ day of May 1994.

Char\te& A. Schultz
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the V -,(-

day of May 1994, I

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief to the
persons at the addresses listed below by depositing a copy in the
United States Mail, postage prepaid.
Michael Z. Hayes
MAZURAN & HAYES P.C.
1245 East Brickyard Road Suite 250
SLC, UT 84106

Charles A. Schultz
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ADDENDUM
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, §78-2a-3(d)

Rule 56

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

set aside must proffer some defense of
sufficient ostensible merit to justify a
that issue. Downey State Bank v.
Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah

at least
trial on
Major1976).

—Setting aside proper.
Where plaintiff served defendant with a
summons, and left a copy with the defendant
which was not the same as the original, the
court had jurisdiction but sufficient confusion
was created so that a motion to set aside the
default judgment should have been granted
and the defendant allowed to plead consistent
with our declared policy that in case of uncertainty, default judgments should be set aside to
allow trial on the merits. Locke v. Peterson, 3
Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955).
Default judgment and writ of garnishment
were properly set aside where trial court failed
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65,
475 P.2d 1005 (1970).
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action,
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promptly objected to date set for trial on the
ground that their counsel had an already
scheduled appearance in another court on that
date, but due to fact that there were no law or
motion days between time objection was filed
and trial date, objection was never heard, refusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
T i m e for a p p e a l .
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal
from a default judgment in a city court ran
from the date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather than from the date of judgment.
Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d
124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank
& Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)l.
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 406
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young L a w R e v i e w . — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. J u r . 2d Judgments
§§ 1152 to 1213.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to liability against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d
1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney'i
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d
1255.
Failure to give notice of application for default judgment where notice is required only
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key N u m b e r s . — Judgment «=» 92 to 134.

Rule 56. Summary judgment
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show t h a t there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and t h a t the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
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Rule 56

pleadings and the evidence hcf^e it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) F o r m of affidavits; f u r t h e r testimony; defense r e q u i r e d . Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing t h a t
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time t h a t any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Availability of motion.
ANALYSIS
Cross-motions.
Affidavit.
Damages.
—Contents.
Discovery.
—Corporation.
Disputed facts.
—Experts.
Evidence.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Facts considered.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
—Improper evidence.
Resting on pleadings.
—Proof.
—Objection.
—Weight of testimony.
—Sufficiency.
Improper party plaintiff.
—Hearsay and opinion testimony
Issue of fact.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Corporate existence.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Deeds.
—Verified pleading.
—Lease as security.
-Waiver of right to contest.
Judicial attitude.
—When unavailable.
Motion for new trial.
-—Exclusive control of facts.
Motion to dismiss.
—Who may make.
Motion to reconsider.
Affirmative defense.
Notice.
Answers to interrogatories.
—Provision not jurisdictional.
•Appeal.
—Waiver of defect.
-Adversely affected party.
Procedural due process.
-Standard of review.
Purpose.
Attorney's fees.

78-2a-3

JUDICIAL CODE

a successor is appointed and qualified The presiding
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges Assignment to panels
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
of Appeals The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel The
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
presiding judge from among the members of trie court
by majority vote of all judges The term of office of the
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
elected A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
may serve in that office no more than two successive
terms The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or
incapacity of the presiding judge
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
of the Court of Appeals In addition to the duties of a
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
shall
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of
panels,
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court,
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the
Court of Appeals, and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
Court and the Judicial Council
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the
same as for the Supreme Court
1988
7&-2a-3. Court of Appeals
jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees, or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer,
(b) appeals from the district court review of
d) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies, and
(n) a challenge to agency action under
Section 63-46a-12 1,
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts,
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court,
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony,
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony,
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree
or capital felony,
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(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for ei
traordinary writs challenging the decisions of the
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a fin*
degree or capital felony,
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to
divorce annulment property division, child custody, support visitation adoption and paternit)
ij) appeals from the Utah Military Court, and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeal*
from the Supreme Court
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination any matter over which the Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings
i»
78-2a-4% Review of actions by Supreme Court
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of tht
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of cerU
oran to the Supreme Court
1M
78-2a-5% Location of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has its pi incipal location IA
Salt Lake City The Court of Appeals may perform
any of its functions in any location within the state
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